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THE KENYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION (KNDR)
MONITORING PROJECT∗
AGENDA ITEM 1
IMMEDIATE ACTION TO STOP VIOLENCE AND RESTORE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
Report on Status of Implementation
January 2009
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
1. This report assesses the progress made in implementing Agenda Item 1 of the
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process (Immediate Action to Stop
Violence and Restore Fundamental Rights and Liberties). Data on which this
report is based was collected using a mix of methods. The baseline survey and
field data are based on people’s perceptions about implementation of the KNDR
agenda points. The following are some of the highlights on findings.
2. Demobilisation and disbandment of the militia: From the outset, in February
2008, the mediation process emphasised the need to demobilise and disband
illegal armed groups and militias. From March 2008, the police and the military
began an operation to stop the activities of the Sabaot Land Defence Force
(SLDF) and later the Mungiki and other groups that had been armed and
mobilised for violence. Although the operation largely restored calm in the
affected areas, sporadic activities by illegal armed groups have been noted.
Ongoing acts of violence nothwithstanding, results from a December 2008
national baseline survey show 60% of Kenyans feel that violence from local
armed groups has decreased and 57% believe that this violence will decrease
further in the next one year. However, there are grave concens about the manner
in which the police dealt with these groups. Human rights abuses in the course
of police operations have undermined the confidence of Kenyans in the security
apparatus.
3. More importantly, no formal process to demobilise and disband illegal armed
groups has been put in place. The national baseline survey shows that 67% of
Kenyans believe illegal armed groups have not been completely disbanded or
demobilised. Although the various militia have not been active, they are alive
and well in different parts of the country. Local militia, therefore, remain a
security threat as dormant groups can be reactivated with ease should political
circumstances so require.
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4. Enhancing security and protection of the population: Although police claim a
six percentage reduction in the rate of crime from the previous year1, insecurity
persists in the flashpoints of violence. The government has established extra
police stations, posts and patrol bases in areas prone to violence and in particular
in areas from which the current internally displaced persons were evicted. This
notwithstanding, attacks and threats against IDPs living close by continue. This
suggests that ‘policing’ communities is not enough to guarantee their security.
Other reforms that address the fundamental causes of the post-election violence
must be undertaken to lay the basis for the security of the population. The
baseline survey reveals that only 28% of the respondents feel safer now than just
after the 2007 elections.
5. Restoring fundamental rights and liberties of peaceful assembly: In January
2009, the international NGO, Freedom House, reported Kenya’s democracy
rating to have deteroriated from “free” to “partly free.” The fundamental rights,
freedoms and liberties of Kenyans -- especially with regard to peaceful assembly
-- continued to be curtailed throughout the year. The police violently dispersed
public gatherings and demonstrations, including those of IDPs protesting over
insecurity, citizens campaigning to have Members of Parliament pay tax on their
allowances, and the media demanding a review of the Kenya Communications
Amendment Act. Over 60% of the respondents in the baseline survey felt that
the government did not respect basic human rights. On the whole, fundamental
rights and freedoms are constrained; democracy is on recession compared to the
period between 2003 and 2007.
6. Implementation of the CIPEV report: The coalition Government has made some
progress in initiating implementation of the report by the Commission of Inquiry
into Post-Election Violence. The coalition partners signed the agreement to set
up the Special Tribunal for Kenya. Although the Cabinet and Parliament have
adopted the report, Parliament failed to meet the deadline for passing laws to set
up the Special Tribunal that would try those suspected to bear the greatest
responsibility for the post-election violence. Commitment to the implementation
of the report and to deal with impunity will depend on the political environment
at the time that suspects are charged.
7. There are several challenges around implementation of the CIPEV
recommendations. Firstly, both parties did not have internal consensus on how
to implement the recommendations in the commission’s report. Divisions and
disagreements on different aspects of the recommendations are likely to
negatively affect implementation. Secondly, some of the prosecution witnesses
have reportedly received threats to dissuade them from giving evidence at the
Special Tribunal. It is likely that some witnesses may decline to give evidence if
their protection is not guaranteed.
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Kenya Police, December 2008
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General conclusion
8. Findings show that there was no systematic approach to disbandment of the
illegal armed groups. The informal nature of illegally armed groups and the
failure to establish the members or their sponsors has made it difficult to arrest
and prosecute them. These groups remain dormant; they can be reactivated with
ease for purpose of political violence. Many of those involved in violence used
ordinary tools – the tools they use during peace times. It is unlikely that these
groups will not be prepared and armed with sophisticated weapons in future
political violence.
9. Fundamental rights and freedoms are constrained. Democracy is on recession
compared to the period between 2003 and 2007. There is urgent need to promote
and safeguard freedoms and fundamental rights. There is need for the coalition
partners to publicly mobilise support for respect of freedoms and fundamental
rights at all times. It is important for KNDR members to provide leadership in
this regard.
10. Comprehensive reforms and promotion of democratic governance is a must.
Failure to reform would mean another violent conflict – the illegal armed groups
will not be poorly equipped for any conflict in future.
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MAIN FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
11. The report covers the period between February 2008 and January 2009. It is
based on primary data, including data from field and key informant interviews as
well as analysis of secondary data (media and other reports). The report also
incorporates findings from the national baseline survey. The survey is based on
perceptions or people’s opinions with regard to the four agenda points of the
KNDR process.
12. The report covers the following key issues:
a. Stopping the wave of violence that had gripped the country.
b. Enhancing the security and protection of the population and its property
c. Ensuring that freedom of expression, press freedom and the right to peaceful
assembly are upheld.
d. Progress in the implementation of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV).
13. In February 2008, the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM) agreed to take action to stop the wave of
violence that had gripped the country.2 This agreement required the police to act
in accordance with the Constitution and the law. They were required to perform
their duties and carry out their responsibilities with “complete impartiality and
without regard to ethnicity, political persuasion, or other partisan
consideration.”3
14. The agreement emphasised the need for leaders to embrace and preach peaceful
coexistence of all communities as well as to refrain from irresponsible and
provocative statements. Local community, religious, political, business and civil
society leaders were expected to hold joint meetings to promote peace and
tranquility and to stand up for justice and fairness.
15. All illegal armed groups and militias were to be demobilised and disbanded
while all youth throughout the country were to desist from participating in acts
of lawlessness, particularly those leading to harm or loss of human life and
destruction of property. Further, the victims and those affected by violence were
asked to exercise restraint and avoid any acts of revenge or retaliation.
16. Fundamental rights and civil liberties had to be restored; the Government was to
ensure that freedom of expression, press freedom and the right to peaceful
assembly were upheld. Hate and threatening messages, leaflets, short text
messages, or any other broadcasts of that nature were to cease forthwith.
2

‘ Agreed statement on Security issues,’ signed on 1 February 2008
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17. The Government was to enforce law and order to protect life and property. The
Government was required to protect all Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and
assist them to return safely to their homes and places of work. Their rights to
reside anywhere in the country were to be upheld.
18. This report looks at the progress made in implementing the various aspects of
Agenda Item 1. It also asseses the challenges faced and draws some conclusions.
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION
Stopping Violence, Demobilisation and Disbanding of the Militia
19. After signing the National Accord, the Coalition Government began to curb the
operations of the Mungiki and SLDF – the most prominent illegally armed
groups in the country at the time.
20. A military operation dubbed ‘Okoa Maisha,4 which began on March 10, 2008 in
Mt. Elgon District sought to disband and disarm SLDF and curtail its operations
in the area. The military operation recovered 100 guns, and almost 2,000 rounds
of ammunition. Over 1,000 suspected SLDF members were arrested.5 The
operation was heavy handed and generated numerous claims of torture of
civilians by the military.6
21. From April 2008, the police sought to disband Mungiki after members of the
group held huge demonstrations seeking the release of their leader from prison.
Several Mungiki leaders were subsequently killed. Some human rights
organisations observed that the police were targeting the group’s leaders for
elimination as the war against Mungiki intensified. Mutilated bodies of abducted
victims were allegedly found in forests and morgues around Nairobi. The Kenya
Police denied claims that they deliberately targeted the members but human
rights organisations insisted that the police are responsible for torture, killings
and dumping the suspects’ bodies.7
22. Interviews at the local level throw up the names of illegal armed groups or
vigilante groups, suggesting their continued existence:

4

Save lives
“Army withdraws from Mt Elgon amid torture claims”-The Standard, September 2, 2008
6
See Mountain of Terror, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2008; All the Men Have Gone:
War Crimes in Kenya’s Mt Elgon Conflict, Human Rights Watch, July 2008; Robert Romborah Simiyu,
Militianisation of resource conflicts: The case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon Region of Western
Kenya, Institute of Security Studies, Monograph 152, October 2008
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Interview with an official of Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, January 2009
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ILLEGALLY
GROUP

ARMED

ETHNIC
GROUP
ASSOCIATED WITH IT

AREA OF OPERATION

Molo/Mau area
Molo/Mau area
Molo
Pockets countrywide
Kibera
Kibera (Gatwekera area)
Most parts of the country

Taliban

Kalenjin
Kalenjin
Kalenjin
Mostly Kikuyu
Luo
Luo
Mixed ethnic groups but defined
by criminal nature, age and
social status
Luhya
Nubi
Mixed ethnic groups but defined
by criminal nature, age and
social status.
Kalenjin
Kalenjin
Sabaot
Abagusii
Digo but including members from
the wider Mijikenda tribes
Luo

Kosovo
Kebago
Sungu Sungu

Luo and Luhya
Kisii
Kisii

Balarget Land Defence Force
Kalenjin Land Defenders
Kalenjin Youths
Mungiki
Baghdad boys
Siafu
Mayouth or Maboys

Bukhungu boys
Labour youth
Kamjesh

People’s Liberation Army
Group of 41
Sabaot Land Defence Force
Chinkororo
Mombasa Republican Council

Kibera
Kibera
Most parts of the country

Rift valley
Rift Valley
Mt. Elgon
Kisii
Kwale (Mulungunipa Forest)
Mathare, Huruma, Baba Dogo,
Kariobangi North and Kariobangi
South
Kibera
Kisii
Nyanza Province

*Table showing illegally armed groups existing as at December 29, 2008. Data collected from field
research.
23. The proliferation of these armed groups can be attributed – at least in part – to
the failure to arrest, prosecute and punish their members and/or sponsors.
24. Respondents repeatedly said that most of these groups were formed quickly to
protect their respective communities and localities. According to some
respondents, youth organised themselves along ethnic lines to fight rival
communities. They had no names, no formal organisation, and no plans for selfperpetuation.8 In many instances, there was no use of conventional weapons;
people were using the tools they use during peace times e.g. implements for
tilling their land. After the post-election violence, the groups simply
disappeared. Given the fact that these groups are dormant and that they existed
along certain informal structures, it is possible – indeed likely – that they could
be mobilised with ease if circumstances so require.

8

Interview with an Imam based in Nakuru, December 2008
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25. Disarmament of these groups: Throughout the last quarter of 2008, there were
reported instances of mopping up guns especially in North Rift Valley. Police
records show that by the end of 2008, some 664 guns, 7,138 ammunition rounds
and 174 explosive devices had been recovered. The government has ratified the
Nairobi Protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms and
light weapons in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa but a domestic policy is
yet to be put in place.
26. The disarmament approach has been largely indistinguishable from the approach
to dealing with ordinary problems of insecurity. This is notwithstanding the fact
that these illegally armed groups represent a different (and more sophisticated)
form of security threat.
27. Three main challenges face the police in disbanding the illegal armed groups
such as Mungiki. First is the difficulty of identifying members, especially
because the groups have fluid organisational structures. For example, in
Mungiki, informants said “most of them no longer keep dreadlocks which used
to be their identification mark.”9 Furthermore, so many other people who are not
members of the group wear dreadlocks.
28. Secondly, the public does not cooperate with law enforcement agents in
identifying suspected members of such groups for arrest and prosecution10
because of fear of reprisals from the militia, often witnessed when they suspect
someone has reported them to the police.
29. Third, is the difficulty posed by politicisation of violence. Some politicians
mobilise youth to act against their rivals for political gain. Respondents said
“some politicians have been using Mungiki as their personal armies”11. When
there are no politicians to finance their operations, illegal groups turn to
extortion. They “extort money just to provide an income to their members.”12
30. It is disturbing that the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia reported in
February/March 2008 that two containers loaded with illegal arms had been
smuggled into the country during the post-election violence. The UN group
identified the buyer as “a militia group in Kenya”. 13 Even though this was
reported early in the year, no follow up action has been reported. It is likely that
the illegal arms that the youth used during the post-election violence are still in
the hands of these groups. This underscores the need for speed in addressing the
factors that precipitated the crisis so that the social basis for the existence of
these groups is effectively weakened.

9

Interview with police officer, January 2009
ibid
11
Ibid
12
Interview with a member conducted in Kibera, December 2008
13
“Where are the guns?” Saturday Standard July 19 2008
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ENHANCING SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION
Improving security
31. The Government has built several police stations, police posts and patrol bases
in areas affected by post-election violence, and in particular in those areas that
witnessed the eviction of people who became IDPs. The government also plans
to double police recruitment to increase the police to population ratio. In
addition, there has been ongoing capacity building through provision of training
for the provincial administration on Peace Building and Conflict Management,
among other efforts.
32. In spite of these developments, many informants as well as respondents in the
baseline survey point at insecurity as an issue of concern. In Nairobi, for
instance, some landlords in the informal settlements of Kibera, Mathare and
Huruma have not returned to their houses. Some were forcibly evicted and their
houses taken up. An ethnic-based settlement pattern has evolved in some areas,
making it difficult for landlords to collect rents, especially if their houses are
located in areas predominantly settled by tenants from an ethnic group different
from theirs.
Non-partiality of security agencies
33. Even though calm has returned to some of the areas from which IDPs were
evicted, perceptions of police partiality in providing security for residents
persist. For instance, some Mau residents feel police still favour one community
over another.14 Some respondents in Uasin Gishu District expressed similar
feelings. They observed that police stations are set up in areas inhabited by the
one ethnic community and that officers from this community also man the
stations.15
34. Perceptions of partiality in how the police tackle insecurity in some of the areas
that witnessed violence in the aftermath of the election require clear strategies to
diminish their basis.
Retaliatory violence
35. Cases of retaliatory violence against IDPs continue to be reported. Leaflets
warning families displaced by the post-election violence to leave Molo,
Elburgon, Keringet, Kuresoi and Kamwaura divisions in the Rift Valley were
circulated and found in November and December 2008. In late November 2008,
unknown persons attacked the IDP camp at Githiriga in Molo at night, damaged
property and then re-displaced the IDPs to another camp at Mungetho.

14
15

Mau residents views in a focus group discussion, December 2008
Uasin Gishu residents views in a focus group discussion, December 2008
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36. These events suggest that the problem of insecurity is yet to be fully addressed.
Lack of a coherent strategy in dealing with illegal armed groups, coupled with
failure to promote reconciliation at the local level, undermines the people’s
sense of security. Continued attacks on IDPs, no matter how sporadic or few, is
a pointer to unresolved hostility, low inter-communal trust and the
Government’s inability to guarantee its citizens’ safety.
ENSURING THAT

THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, PRESS FREEDOM AND THE RIGHT TO

PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY ARE UPHELD

37. During the post-election violence, as in any conflict situation, fundamental rights
and freedoms were grossly violated. Agenda Item 1 emphasised the restoration
and upholding of freedom of expression, press freedom, and the right to peaceful
assembly as critical to ending the political crisis.
38. Some progress was made in restoring some of these rights in the first quarter of
2008 after the signing of the National Accord. For instance, the Government
lifted the ban on live television and radio broadcasts. A Freedom of Information
policy, which anchors media freedom and repeals the Official Secrets Act,
which has been in the pipeline since 2007, is due for debate in Parliament, as is a
Freedom of Information bill.
39. However, the freedom of media has been constrained throughout the period.
Some have even argued that Kenya’s democracy has been in recession following
erosion of these rights. Freedom House in particular dropped Kenya’s
classification from “free” to “partly free” in its ranking of countries and their
respect for fundamental freedoms.16
40. Freedom of assembly has been severely constrained. Citizens’ right to petition
the Government has been challenged whenever it has been exercised. The police
have violently dispersed protesting citizens in several urban areas. IDPs
protesting against delays in the provision of assistance for resettlement and
growing insecurity have been violently dispersed. Similarly, protests by civil
society groups as well as the media were violently dispersed by the police. These
incidences, on their own, are a pointer to slow or limited progress in restoring
fundamental rights, and in particular, freedom of assembly.
41. The government is yet to enact laws that enhance freedom of information and
legislate against hate speech. Fast-tracking these laws are critical. Urgent,
however, is the need to fast track the constitutional review process, which will
set the foundation for Kenya’s rights culture.

16

Freedom in the World Report (2008), accessible at www.freedomhouse.org
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
42. Government’s efforts to disband the Mungiki and SLDF groups were not
structured along the internationally accepted practices of disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration. The informal nature of illegally armed groups
and the failure to establish the members or their sponsors has made it difficult to
arrest and prosecute them.
43. Some effort has gone into enhancing the security and protection of the
population. However, the population is yet to feel the effects of these efforts as
shown by respondents in the baseline survey as well as cases of retaliatory
attacks by IDPs. Urgent measures to eliminate the perception of police bias in
the performance of their duties are required, especially in areas affected by the
post-election violence in order to restore the confidence of the public in law
enforcement officers.
44. Fundamental rights and freedoms are constrained; there is continued erosion of
rights and gains made with respect to enjoyment of freedoms. Democracy is on
recession compared to the period between 2003 and 2007. In order to safeguard
fundamental freedoms of the media, as well as the freedom of assembly and
association, an improved policy environment, linked to a new constitution is
critical. The repeal of retrogressive laws and re-orienting law enforcement
agencies needs to get under way with haste.
45. Members of the KNDR mediation process will be required to demonstrate
leadership in furthering these reforms. There is a need for them to publicly
mobilise support for enjoyment of freedoms and rights at all times. It is critical
that KNDR demand that others in government be held accountable when
fundamental rights and freedoms are abused and/or neglected. Sensitising the
two principals on the need to take leadership in giving directions on promotion
and safequarding of rights and freedoms is important.
46. In general comprehensive reforms and promotion of democratic governance is a
must. Failure to reform would mean another violent conflict – the illegal armed
groups will not be poorly equipped for a conflict in future.
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The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project
Agenda Item 1
Immediate Action to Stop Violence and Restore Fundamental Rights and Liberties
Draft report on Status of Implementation
(Draft Matrix on Progress)
Objective

Violence halted

Objectively
Verifiable
Indicators
No. of incidents
of political
violence

No. of actions
taken to stop
political violence

Required action

Progress

Remarks

Government to stop
any
incidents
of
political violence.

Hardly any reported cases of
political violence

Enforce ban on illegal
groups;
Government
to
carry
out
demobilisation
and
disbandment of militia
and illegally armed
groups; Policy enacted
to mop up illegal guns

Police and Military launched a
crackdown on the Mungiki and
the Sabaot Land Defence Force;
sporadic low-key mopping up of
illegal arms carried out.

This is a positive sign. However, Kenya is yet to
witness political competition that would make use of
political violence attractive. The referendum on a
new constitution and another election would provide
opportunity for political violence if institutional
reforms are not undertaken.
Informal illegal groups could re-emerge – some
could be dormant; no policy on demobilisation of
the militias
There is need to operationalise the Nairobi Protocol
for the prevention, control and reduction of small
arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes and the
Horn of Africa.
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Fundamental
rights restored

No. of incidents
that violate the
fundamental
rights
and
freedom
of
expression
No. of incidents
that violate press
freedom.

No. of incidents
that violate the
freedom
of
peaceful
assembly
No. of enabling
legislation
enacted

Government to
guarantee and respect
citizens fundamental
rights and freedom of
expression

There have been cases of police
violently dispersing civilian
demonstrations
aimed
at
petitioning the Government

Respect of fundamental rights of association and
freedom of expression is on decline.

Government to
guarantee and respect
press freedom

The President advised the
Attorney General to look into the
concerns
raised
(especially
allegations that the law would
curtail press freedom) by the
stakeholders
regarding
the
Communications
of
Kenya
(Amendment) Act, 2008
The police have continued to
violently
disperse
civilian
demonstrations aimed to petition
the Government and other duty
bearers
Communications Act (1998) is
being reviewed

The government should address the concerns raised
regarding the law and put in place measures to
promote independence and freedom of the media.

Government to
guarantee and respect
freedom of peaceful
assembly
Parliament to enact
relevant laws to
guarantee fundamental
rights of expression
and press

Harmonious relationship needs to be cultivated
between the media fraternity and government to fasttrack the reform agenda
The Government needs to put in place measures to
guarantee the freedom of assembly.

Relevant laws are not yet passed
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